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Abstract
Vessels of all sizes can be used in a number of ways by terrorists, they  can utilize a vessel as a means, 
a weapon, a bomb, or as a disruption tool. When a terrorist attack happens, it is already too late, hence 
the critical importance for the international community to take timely, accurate and efficientex ante 
factosteps.Counter-terrorism measures implemented on the high seas to prevent maritime terrorist 
attacks from occurring are possible but limited by the international law and notably the law of the 
sea. To some extent, the law of the sea limits counter-terrorism efforts. On the high seas, enforcement 
measures against terrorists or terrorist-related activities on board foreign vessels are restricted by the 
principle of exclusivity of flag State jurisdiction (a). Nevertheless, the application of the principle 
can be derogated from by the right of visit which provides for, under certain conditions, some leeway 
to States in their fight against maritime terrorism (b). it is difficult to justify interdiction operations 
carried out in order to counter terrorist threats on the high seas by the right of self-defence. The first 
reason relates to the differences in rationale and legal regime between the force deployed during 
interdiction operations and the one used in self-defence (a); the second reason concerns the existence 
or not of a right of anticipatory self-defence (b).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Covering most of the world’s surface, the oceans are a place for 
many commercial, recreational and military activities1. At the same 
time, the maritime domain, and notably the high seas, is vulnerable to 
terrorist activities. The hijacking of the Italian Achille Lauro in 1985, 
the suicide attack in 2000 against the US Navy destroyer Cole, the at-
tack against the French supertanker Limburg in 2002, andthe bombing 
of the Philippine Super Ferry 14 in 2004 are examples amongst others 
of threat to maritime security posed by terrorism2.The Council for Se-
* Associate Professor at Bahrain Polytechnic. The author can be reached at eric_cor-
thay@hotmail.com.
1  Robin Bowley, Countering Terrorism in the Maritime Domain: a Contemporary 
Evaluation of the International Legal Framework, PhD thesis, Australian National 
Center for Ocean Resources and Security, University of Wollongong, 2013, at 74, 
available athttp://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/4262.
2  For a non-exhaustive list of maritime terrorist activities, not only on the high seas, 
seeid., Appendix G; RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents, available at 
http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php.
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curity Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific’s Working Group on Maritime 
Cooperation has proposed to explain maritime terrorism as follows: 
the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime envi-
ronment, using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or 
against any one of their passengers or personnel, against coastal facili-
ties or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or 
cities.3
This explanation does not define what terrorism is. For argument 
sake, as to date no internationally recognized definition of the term has 
been adopted, the present writer proposes to define terrorism as being 
a modus operandi consisting in an unlawful act of intentional violence 
which induces extreme fear among victims in order to compel a well 
identified target to do or to abstain from doing any act4.
Vessels of all sizes can be used in a number of ways by terrorists. 
Indeed, to further their aims, terrorists can utilize a vessel as a means, 
a weapon, a bomb, or as a disruption tool5. Using this classification, a 
range of maritime terrorism activities can be postulated, such as using 
commercial cargo containers to transport terrorists and smuggle materi-
als and weapons, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD), for 
an unconventional attack on land (vessel as a means); ramming a high-
speed boat into warship, cruise liner, ferry or oil tanker; seizing control 
of a ship and using it as a collision weapon for destroying offshore 
platforms, port facilities, bridges or other targets on the waterfront (ves-
sel as a weapon); seizing and exploding ships with volatile cargoes in 
proximity to a land or offshore target (vessel as a bomb); sinking a large 
commercial cargo in a critical choke-point, or set ablaze to a chemical 
tanker in a busy strait or port to block traffic or cause pollution (vessel 
3  Definition cited in Akiva Lorenz, The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to Israel, Sept. 
24, 2007, available in http://www.ict.org.il/Article/983/The%20Threat%20of%20
Maritime%20Terrorism%20to%20Israel.
4  For a detailed explanation of the constitutive elements of this definition, see Eric 
Corthay, ‘Le concept de terrorisme ou la définition d’un monstre polycéphale’, 
L’Observateur des Nations Unies, spec. num. 20 & 21, 2006, at 136.
5  Tanner Campbell, Rohan Gunaratna, ‘Maritime Terrorism, Piracy and Crime’, in 
Rohan Gunaratna (ed.), Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific: Threat and Response, Singa-
pore, Eastern Universities Press, 2003, at 80. For Campbell and Gunaratna, vessels 
are also seen as a target to be destroyed.
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as a disruption tool)6. The high seas might therefore be used as a domain 
from which, through which, or within which maritime terrorist attacks 
and activities are perpetrated. Even though they do not represent per se 
a terrorist attack, terrorist activities in preparation of a terrorist attack 
already represent a terrorist threat that needs to be dealt with by the 
international community.
When a terrorist attack happens, it is already too late, hence the 
critical importance for the international community to take timely, ac-
curate and efficientex ante factosteps.Counter-terrorism measures im-
plemented on the high seas to prevent maritime terrorist attacks from 
occurring are possible but limited by the international law and notably 
the law of the sea. Indeed, vessels on the high seas are subject to the ex-
clusive jurisdiction and authority of the State whose flag they lawfully 
fly. In other words, and prima facie, a State A’s warship cannot take 
measures against State B’s vessels sailing on the high seas. However, 
the exclusivity rule is not an absolute one from which no derogation 
is permitted. International law permits interference with non-national 
vessels in certain specific circumstances defined by customary or con-
ventional law. One of the derogations or exceptions to the principle of 
exclusivity is the right of visit (droit de visit)enshrined in Article 110 
of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea7 [hereinafter “the 
1982 Convention”]. The right of visit authorizes warships on the high 
seas to conduct maritime interdiction operations against foreign ves-
sels– i.e. visiting, boarding, searching and seizing vessels. From a ter-
minological viewpoint, it must be stressed that the expression maritime 
‘interdiction’ operation is also sometimes called maritime ‘interception’ 
6 See, e.g., Michael Greenberg, et al., Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability, RAND 
Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy, 2006, at 27; Michael Richardson, A 
Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction,Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004, at 8; Anthony Bergin, 
Sam Bateman, Future Unknown: The Terrorist Threat to Australian Maritime Securi-
ty, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2005, at 35; US Department of Homeland Se-
curity, National Strategy for Maritime Security, Sept. 1, 2005, at 4,available in https://
www.hsdl.org/?collection&id=4#Maritime [hereinafter “2005 National Strategy for 
Maritime Security”]; John F. Frittelli, Port and Maritime Security: Background and 
Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, May 27, 2005, at 7.
7  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (opened for signature Dec. 10, 
1982), 1833 UNTS 3.
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operation. The definitions of the two terms – which are not present in 
the 1982 Convention – are not clear. Authors and States confer to them 
different definitions, use them sometimes interchangeably8 and in or-
der to refer to diverse situations (e.g. for the purpose of peacekeeping, 
to stop boat-people, to suppress threats, or to enforce UN sanctions)9. 
However, as observed by Papastavridis in general the term ‘intercep-
tion’ seems to have a broader meaning that the term ‘interdiction’, in 
the sense that the former one is a “generic and commonly used term” 
that “encompass[es] all cases of interference with foreign vessels on the 
high seas and not only these excused under article 110 of LOSC [Law 
of the Sea Convention]”10.
To some extent, the law of the sea limits counter-terrorism efforts. 
Pursuant to Article 110 of the 1982 Convention, the right of visit can 
only be invoked in limited circumstances which actually do not explic-
itly cover maritime terrorism. States have therefore moved towards the 
adoptionof treaties that provide for a right of visit in case of maritime 
terrorism-related threats. These treaties establish express and/or implied 
consent regimes, but also impose a series of constraints that weaken 
and slow down counter-terrorism efforts. After analysing the content 
and scope of application of the principle of exclusivity of flag State 
jurisdiction, the present paper aims at clarifying some aspects of the 
right of visit as set forth in the 1982 Convention and other treaties (I).
Some States and authors have also justified the lawfulness of interdic-
tion operations carried out to counter terrorist threats on the high seas 
by the right of self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
At first sight, this legal path could be seen as an appropriate means to 
8 See, e.g. Patricia Mallia, Migrant Smuggling by Sea: Combating a Current Threat to 
Maritime Security through the Creation of a Cooperative Framework, Leiden, Marti-
nus Nijhoff, 2010, at 21: “the process of “interception” (or interdiction), the ordinary 
meaning of which is to prevent something from proceeding or arriving, is not limited 
solely to the migrant smuggling context, but is a tool used in the suppression of other 
threats”.
9  For different definitions from authors or from States, see Efthymios Papastavridis, 
The Interception of Vessels on the High Seas: Contemporary Challenges to the Legal 
Order of the Oceans, Studies in International Law, Oxford and Portland, Hart Publish-
ing, 2014, at 60-61.
10 Id., at 61-62. Examples of interference other than those excused under art. 110 of 
the 1982 Convention are, notably, interference justified by circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness like consent, state of necessity, or countermeasures.
Terrorist threat on the high seas : Analysis of some aspects ...
155Volume 14 Number 2 January 2017
circumvent the problem of the strict application of the right of visit and 
the constraints created by treaties authorising boarding under specific 
conditions. Nonetheless, the invocation of the right of self-defence to 
justify interdiction operations in anticipation of a terrorist attack is still 
highly dubious. This paper explains that such a perplexity is due to at 
least two main reasons which relate, firstly, to the different rationales 
(telos) behind – and therefore the legal regimes governing –the force 
deployed during interdiction and self-defence operations, and, then, 
to the question of the existence or not of a right of anticipatory self-
defence (II).
II. THE PRINCIPLE OF EXCLUSIVITY OF FLAG STATE JURIS-
DICTION AND THE RIGHT OF VISIT
On the high seas, enforcement measures against terrorists or ter-
rorist-related activities on board foreign vessels are restricted by the 
principle of exclusivity of flag State jurisdiction (a). Nevertheless, the 
application of the principle can be derogated from by the right of visit 
which provides for, under certain conditions, some leeway to States in 
their fight against maritime terrorism (b).
A. THE EXCLUSIVITY RULE
As a general rule, vessels on the high seas11are subject to the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the State whose flag they lawfully fly. In other 
words, pursuant to theprinciple of exclusivity of flag State jurisdiction, 
on the high seas States may not interferewith and have no authority on 
the vessels of other States.This pillar of the international law of the sea 
has been invoked by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 
Lotus case in these terms:
vessels on the high seas are subject to no authority except that of the 
State whose flag they fly. In virtue of the principle of the freedom of the 
seas, that is to say, the absence of any territorial sovereignty upon the 
high seas, no State may exercise any kind of jurisdiction over foreign 
vessels upon them. 12
11  For a definition of “high seas”, seeart. 86 of the 1982 Convention.
12 The Case of the SS ‘Lotus’ (France v. Turkey), Judgment, PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 10 
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As Reuland observed, “the principle of exclusivity of flag-state ju-
risdiction[…] is firmly rooted in the axioms of state equality and the 
freedom of the high seas.”13Indeed, in Le Louis case, for example, Lord 
Stowell clearly stated that:
[A]ll nations being equal, all have an equal right to the uninterrupted use 
of the unappropriated parts of the ocean for their navigation. In places 
where no local authority exists, where the subjects of all states meet upon 
a footing of entire equality and independence, no one state, or any of its 
subjects, has a right to assume or exercise authority over the subjects of 
another.14
The principle of exclusivity of flag State jurisdiction is codified in 
international treaties and notably in Article 92(1) of the 1982 Conven-
tion, which provides that “[s]hips shall sail under the flag of one State 
only and, save inexceptional cases expressly provided for in interna-
tional treaties or in thisConvention, shall be subject to its exclusive ju-
risdiction on the high seas.”15The exclusivity rule applies to ships with 
one nationality.According to Article 91(1) of the 1982 Convention, “[s]
hips have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to fly”. 
Article 92(2) of the same Convention states also that “[a] ship which 
sails under the flags of two or more States […] may be assimilated to a 
ship without nationality.”These ships are assimilated to stateless ships 
– i.e. ships not sailing under the flag of any State –and as such are not 
protected under international law16.
(1927), at 25.
13  Robert C. F. Reuland, ‘Interference with Non-National Ships on the High Seas: 
Peacetime Exceptions to the Exclusivity Rule of Flag-State Jurisdiction’, Vanderbilt 
Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 22, 1989, at 1164. The freedom of the high seas 
rule is codified in art. 87 of the 1982 Convention.
14 Le Louis, 2 Dods. 210, 243, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464, 1475 (1817). See also, United 
States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 878 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); 
United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 27 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 
(1983).
15 See also art. 6(1) of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas: “Ships shall sail under 
the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional cases expressly provided for in 
international treaties or in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction 
on the high seas.” Convention on the High Seas (opened for signature Apr. 29, 1958), 
450 UNTS 11 [hereinafter “the 1958 Convention”].
16  Satya N. Nandan, Shabtai Rosenne, Neal R. Grandy (eds), United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary,Vol. III, Center for Oceans Law and 
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1. An Exception To The Exclusivity Rule:  The Right Of Visit
The exclusivity of flag State jurisdiction on the high seas in time 
of peace is not an absolute rule. Article 92(1) of the 1982 Convention 
points out that ships are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag 
State “save inexceptional cases expressly provided for in international 
treaties or in this Convention”. It is worth mentioning that exceptions 
to the exclusivity rule are not only conventional but might also be cus-
tomary, as customary rules are sometimes codified in treaties and treaty 
provisions receive sometimes a customary character throughout time17. 
As noted in Article 92(1), circumstances of interference with non-na-
tional ships are of exceptional nature. Examples of international treaties 
that provide exceptions to the general rule of exclusive jurisdiction of 
the flag State on the high seas include the 1969 International Conven-
tion relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution 
Casualties18, and the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances which allows 
interference with the consent of the flag State19. In the 1982 Conven-
tion, the exception to the general principle of the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the flag State over ships flying its flag on the high seas is the right of 
visit(droit de visite)20 detailed in Article 110 of the said Convention21. 
Article 110 reflects customary international law22. 
Article 110(1) of the 1982 Convention provides: 
Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, 
a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, other than a 
ship entitled to complete immunity in accordance with articles 95 and 96, 
is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspect-
Policy, The Hague, London, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, at 125.
17  Reuland, supra note 13, at 1167-68. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal 
Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), 
Judgments, ICJ Reports 1969, at para. 69.
18 See art. I of the International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas 
in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties (concluded Nov. 29, 1969), 970 UNTS 211.
19 See art. 17 of the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances (concluded Dec. 20, 1988), 1582 UNTS 164.
20  It seems that the French expressions of the different modes of interference are less 
confused than the English expressions. Reuland, supra note 13, at 1169, footnote 16. 
21 See also art. 22 of the 1958 Convention. The right of visit also applies to the exclu-
sive economic zone, see arts 56, 58 and 60 of the 1982 Convention.
22  Papastavridis, supra note 9, at 66.
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ing that:
(a) the ship is engaged in piracy;
(b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade;
(c) the ship is engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of 
the warship has jurisdiction under article 109;
(d) the ship is without nationality; or
(e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the shipis, in 
reality, of the same nationality as the warship.
2. Circumstances Authorising Interference
Article 110 (1) lists a very limitative series of circumstances under 
which, in time of peace, warships are competent to visit private vessels23 
flying the flag of another State. This is the case when the ship is suspect-
ed of being engaged in any one of the activities listed in sub-paragraphs 
(a) to (c) or of having a doubtful status as per sub-paragraphs (d) and 
(e). The right of visit has been limited to specific circumstances mainly 
because States wanted to jealously safeguard as much as possible their 
exclusive jurisdiction over their own shipping, as well as their rights of 
property, equality and independence on the high seas24.
As terrorism is not expressly listed in paragraph (1), it seems, prima 
facie and unless a treaty relationship authorises interference, that war-
ships are not authorized to exercise their right of visit against a ship 
flying the flag of another State when they merely suspect it of being 
engaged in activities that represent a terrorist threat (e.g. the ship is 
transporting weapons or people to further terrorist aims). A possible 
explanation why terrorist threats and, more generally, acts hostile to 
the State of the warship, have not been included expressis verbis in the 
scope of Article 110(1) could be drawn from the commentary to the 
original draft of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. In its report, the 
International Law Commission – organ responsible for the draft of the 
1958 Convention – observed: 
The question arose whether the right to board a vessel should be recog-
23  According to arts. 95 and 96 of the 1982 Convention, public ships (i.e. a warship 
or a ship used only on government noncommercial service) “have complete immunity 
from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State”.
24  Reuland, supra note 13, at 1167.
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nized also in the event of a ship being suspected of committing acts hostile 
to the State to which the warship belongs, at a time of imminent danger to 
the security of that State. The Commission did not deem it advisable to in-
clude such a provision, mainly because of the vagueness of terms like “im-
minent danger” and “hostile acts”, which leaves them open to abuse25.
Seconda facie, however, it seems that Article 110(1) of the 1982 
Convention could indirectly lead a warship to interfere against a foreign 
ship that represents a terrorist threat. This could happen when, once vis-
iting the ship suspected of being engaged in one of the activities listed 
in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) or of having a suspicious status as per sub-
paragraphs (d) and (e), evidence of proscribed terrorist activities is dis-
covered (e.g. explosive devices ready to be activated, map with location 
of targets). Here, the interference is contingent upon the existence, first, 
of a reasonable suspicion that the foreign ship has an uncertain status or 
is engaged in one of the activities listed in paragraph (1). For example, 
crews of an interfering warship visit a ship that “sails under the flags 
of two or more States, using them according to convenience”26, or a 
ship that is “not flying a national flag or bearing equivalent markings 
identifying its nationality”27, and, when searching on board the inter-
fered ship, some forms of preparation for a terrorist attack are detected. 
Thisoccurred on December 9, 2002, on the high seas, off the coast of 
Yemen, when two Spanish Navy vessels intercepted and boarded the 
So San, a North Korean cargo ship. The Spanish Navy justified the 
boarding on grounds that the ship was not flying a flag and its nation-
al markings were obscured by paint28. When searching, the boarding 
crews found Scud missiles hidden beneath cargo. At the time of the 
discovery, it was not known whether the Scud missiles had been legally 
purchased by Yemen, or whether they were going to be delivered to 
terrorist organizations29. A similar scenario is when the warship’s crews 
25  Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its eighth ses-
sion, 23 April-4 July 1956, Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, Vol. II, Part. One, 1956, at 284 
(commentary 4 of art. 46 – Right of visit).
26 Art. 92(2) of the 1982 Convention.
27  Nandan, Rosenne, Grandy, supra note 16, at 245. Art. 110(1)(d) of the 1982 Con-
vention.
28  Thom Shanker, ‘Threats and Responses: Arms Smuggling; Scud Missiles Found on 
Ship of North Korea’, The New York Times, Dec. 11, 2002, at A1. 
29  Ian Patrick Barry, ‘The Right of Visit, Search and Seizure of Foreign Flagged Ves-
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are ascertaining the status of a ship that, “though flying a foreign flag 
or refusing to show its flag, […] is, in reality, of the same nationality 
as the warship”30, and then, once on board, they notice that the ship is 
engaged in terrorist activities. Acting this way, the ship certainly tries to 
hide its identity. Indeed, for the international Law Commission, when a 
ship conceals its nationality which is in reality the same nationality of 
the warship “it is permissible to presume that the ship has committed 
unlawful acts, and the warship should be at liberty to verify whether 
its suspicions are justified”31. Should suspicions of any engagement in 
terrorist activities be confirmed, it would be very surprising that the 
boarding warship be not allowed to bring the boarded vessel to account.
Article 110(1) of the 1982 Convention also refers to ‘acts of inter-
ference [that] derive from powers conferred by treaty’. It means that 
international treaties permit the right of visit in circumstances other 
than those specified in sub-paragraphs (a) to (e).Several international 
treaties have been signed in response to concerns regarding terrorism 
and/or the proliferation of WMD and related materials. Such treaties 
represent “an important advance in devising a lawful means for the 
exercise of the right of visit against a foreign flagged vessel on the 
high seas”32. Indeed, all these treaties establish express and/or implied 
consent regimes. Nevertheless, they also provide for some provisions 
that could significantlyslow down the exercise of the right of visit.
At the multilateral level, it is worth mentioning the existence of the 
Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation33 [hereinafter “the 
2005 SUA Protocol”]. Articles 3, 3bis, 3ter and 3quarter prohibit a 
wide range of activities spanning from the use of a ship as a weapon 
to the use of a ship as a mode of transport of terrorist material to the 
sels on the High Seas Pursuant to Customary International Law: a Defense of the Pro-
liferation Security Initiative’, Hofstra Law Review, vol. 33, 2004-2005, at 299-300.
30 art. 110(1)(e) of the 1982 Convention.
31  Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its eighth ses-
sion, supra note 25, (commentary 1 of art. 46 – Right of visit).
32  Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea, Oxford, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2011, at 190.
33  Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation (opened for signature Oct. 14, 2005), IMO Doc 
LEG/CONF 15/21. As at Sept. 2016, only 35 States are Parties to the Protocol. 
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targeting of a ship in a terrorist attack34. When a State Party suspects 
a ship of being involved in the commission of an offence set forth in 
the Protocol, it shall request that the flag State confirm the claim of 
nationality35. As per Article 8bis(2), each request shall respect certain 
constraints, like containing the name of the suspect ship, the IMO ship 
identification number, etc. Also, if a request is initially made orally, it 
must be confirmed in writing as soon as possible. Then, pursuant to 
Article 8bis(5)(b), express consent for boarding and searching must be 
granted by the flag State:
If nationality is confirmed, the requesting Party shall ask the first Party 
(hereinafter referred to as “the flag State”) for authorization to board 
and to take appropriate measures with regard to that ship which may in-
clude stopping, boarding, and searching the ship, its cargo, and persons 
on board, and questioning the persons on board in order to determine if 
an offense set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quarter has been, is being 
or is about to be committed.
It is important to mention that, in that case, the flag State may either 
decide to conduct the boarding and search itself,permit the other State 
to do so, or decide that both States may do so together, or the flag State 
has the option of denying permission to board and search36.
The 2005 SUA Protocol alsoprovides an implied consent regime. 
Article 8bis(5)(e) states:
Upon or after depositing its instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, a State Party may notify the Secretary-General 
that, with respect to ships flying its flag or displaying its mark of registry, 
the requesting Party is authorized to board and search a ship, its cargo 
and persons on board, and to question the persons on board in order to 
determine if an offence set forth in article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quater has 
been, is being or is about to be committed37. 
At the regional level, Member States of the Caribbean Community 
signed in 2008 the CARICOM Maritime and Airspace Security 
34 See article 3, 3bis, 3ter or 3quarter of the 2005 SUA Protocol.
35  Art. 8bis(5)(a) of the 2005 SUA Protocol.
36  Art. 8bis(5)(c)) of the 2005 SUA Protocol.
37 See also art. 8bis(5)(d) of the 2005 SUA Protocol.
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Cooperation Agreement [hereinafter “CARICOM Agreement”]38. As at 
August 2016 the Agreement is still not yet in force. The objective of the 
Agreement is to promote cooperation among States Parties to enable 
them to conduct law enforcement operations that relate to, inter alia, 
combating terrorism39. Like the 2005 SUA Protocol, the CARICOM 
Agreement sets forth an express and implied consent regime40. However, 
some provisions of the Agreement also negatively affect the efficiency 
of counter-terrorism efforts. For example, request for verification 
of nationality of a suspected vessel, before the actual boarding and 
search, “may be conveyed orally but shall later be confirmed by written 
communication” which contains specific indications41. Then, once 
the nationality of the vessel is verified, the flag State can still decide 
whether the boarding and search is conducted by its own forces, or by 
the requesting Party’s forces, or by both countries’ forces, or whether it 
prefers to deny permission to board and search42.
At the bilateral level, finally, the United States has signed bilateral 
boarding agreements with several States (Antigua and Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Belize, Croatia, Cyprus, Liberia, Marshall Islands, Malta, 
Mongolia, Panama, St. Vincent and the Grenadines). The Agreements 
establish authority to board foreign vessels suspected of carrying illicit 
shipments of WMD and related material43; they establish implied and/or 
express consent regimes44, and some provisions also limit how quickly 
38  CARICOM Maritime and Airspace Security Cooperation Agreement (opened for 
signature Jul. 4, 2008), available at http://archive.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_in-
struments/agreement_maritime_airspace_security_cooperation.pdf.
39  Art. II(1)(a) and art. II(2)(b) of the CARICOM Agreement.
40 See art. IX(1) and art. IX(4)(b) of the CARICOM Agreement.
41  Art. V(3) of the CARICOM Agreement.
42 See art. IX(2) of the CARICOM Agreement.
43  The agreements between the Government of the United States of America and 
other governments concerning cooperation to suppress the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials by seas are available 
at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27733.htm.
44  Compare, e.g., art. 4 of the Agreement Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Republic of Cyprus Concerning Coop-
eration to Suppress the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery 
Systems, and Related Materials By Sea, with art. 4 of the Agreement Between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of 
Antigua and Barbuda Concerning Cooperation to Suppress the Proliferation of Weap-
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an intervention onboard the foreign ship may occurs45.
4. Modus Operandi
With regard to the modus operandi of the right of visit, Article 
110(2) of the 1982 Convention states:
In the cases provided for in paragraph 1, the warship may proceed 
to verify the ship’s right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat 
under the command of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion 
remains after the documents have been checked, it may proceed to a 
further examination on board the ship, which must be carried out with 
all possible consideration.
According to paragraph (2), the right of visit is composed of two 
distinct operations: ledroit d’enquête du pavillon (right of investiga-
tion of flag) and the right of search46. Taken together, these two distinct 
phases are encompassed within the umbrella term ofmaritime interdic-
tionoperation. The purpose of the first phase of the right of visit – ledroit 
d’enquête du pavillon – is to “verify the ship’s right to fly its flag”, i.e. 
to verify the true nationality of a vessel the warship encounters.In con-
creto, the warship verifies the papers of the ship, i.e. the documents is-
sued by the flag State which granted to the ship the right to fly its flag47.
The warship is authorized to exercise its right of investigation of flag 
only in the cases in which the ship is reasonably suspected of being en-
gaged in some proscribed activity. The criterion of ‘reasonable ground’ 
for suspicion48 is difficult to define in abstracto.It has to be assessed on 
a case by case basis. Authors converge, however, on the view that an 
appropriate reasonable ground standard lies somewhere between mere 
suspicion and actual knowledge of an infringement49.Nowadays, mo-
dern technologies facilitating surveillance, reconnaissance,intelligence-
gathering and information-sharing, help establish the existence of a rea-
ons of Mass Destruction, Their Delivery Systems, and Related Materials By Sea.
45 Id.
46  Reuland, supra note 13, at 1171.
47 See art. 91(2) of the 1982 Convention.
48 See art. 110(1) of the 1982 Convention.
49 See, e.g., Reuland, supra note 13, at 1172, Papastavridis, supra note 9, at 62; Ximena 
Hinrichs, ‘Measures against Smuggling of Migrants at Sea: A Law of the Sea Related 
Perspective’, Revue Belge de Droit International, vol. 36, 2003, at 434.
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sonable suspicion50. 
In order to ascertain whether or not the ship carries the proper pa-
pers on board, the ship must stop its journey. In case of absence of com-
pliant or consensual boarding by the master of the vessel51, the warship 
adopts graduated measures in order to stop the ship. Reuland explains 
the procedure as follows: “[t]o effect a stoppage, the warship will hail 
the suspect vessel or, if this is impossible or ineffectual, fire across her 
bow. Should the suspect vessel prove obstinate, the warship may use 
reasonable force.”52After the stoppage, comes the actual boarding for 
verification of the papers and documentation of the ship. The warship 
“may send a boat under the command of an officer to the suspected 
ship”53.The officer may be a warrant officer or senior petty officer54.If 
50  On some maritime security initiatives proposed or implemented by the US govern-
ment, see, e.g., Yonah Alexander, Tyler B. Richardson (eds), Terror on the High Seas, 
from Piracy to Strategic Challenge, vol. 1, Praeger Security International, 2009, at 
213 ff.
51  Papastavridis, supra note 9, at 67 explains the difference between compliant board-
ing and consensual boarding. Compliant boarding is when “both the flag state and the 
master of the vessel consent to the interception”, while consensual boarding is “[w]
hen the flag state has not replied to the request of the boarding state and the latter 
boards the suspect vessel on the basis of the consent of the master”. Since 2003, the 
rules of engagement of NATO Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean Sea 
permit compliant boarding. See James Kraska, Raul Pedrozo, International Maritime 
Security Law, Leiden, Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013, at 55.
52  Reuland, supra note 13, at 1174 (footnotes omitted), Théodore Ortolan, Règles 
Internationales et Diplomatie de la Mer, Paris, H. Plon, 4th ed, 1864, at 252 ; see also 
Mallia, supra note 8, at 20; René-Jean Dupuy, Daniel Vignes, Traité du nouveau droit 
de la mer, Paris, Economica, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1985, at 371;M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2) 
(Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Judgment, ITLOS Case No 2 (1999), 
38 ILM 1323, at para. 156 [hereinafter “M/V ‘Saiga’(No. 2) case”].
53 Art. 110(2) of the 1982 Convention.
54  Nandan, Rosenne, Grandy, supra note 16, at 245. Some authors note that the veri-
fication of papers may be conducted on board the warship. See, e.g., G. Gidel, Le 
droit international public de la mer: le temps de paix, Châteauroux, Mellottée, 1932-
1934, at 289, reprint in Vaduz, Topos Verlag, Paris, E. Duchemin, 1981, at 290; Lassa 
Oppenheim, International Law: a Treatise, H. Lauterpacht ed, 8th ed., New York, 
McKay, 1955, at para. 268. However, Reuland, supra note 13, at 1175, footnote 33, 
expresses some concern with regard to such an option: “With respect, it does not seem 
prudent to require an officer of the suspect ship to carry the vessel’s papers to the war-
ship for two reasons: first, the papers of a vessel should never be exposed to chance of 
loss; and second, suspicion may remain after the papers are examined and it may be 
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suspicions are dissipated after examination of the papers, the ship is al-
lowed by the warship to go its way55. 
If, after the documents have been checked, suspicion remains – or a 
new suspicion has arisen56 – that the ship is engaged in some proscribed 
activity,the warship may proceed to a further examination on board the 
ship. Here, the warship proceeds to the second phase of the right of 
visit, i.e. the right of search.This second and more intrusive step aims at 
discovering evidence that would confirm the suspicions of the warship, 
and “must be carried out with all possible consideration”57.
The search leads to two different situations: either to the confirma-
tion that the ship is engaged in proscribed activities, or to the dissipa-
tion of all suspicions. In the former case, “the warship may arrest the 
vessel or otherwise bring the vessel to account”58. Oppenheim explains: 
Arrest is effected through the commander of the arresting man-of-war ap-
pointing one of her officers and a part of her crew to take charge of the ar-
rested vessel. This officer is responsible for the vessel, and for her cargo, 
which must be kept safe and intact. The arrested vessel, either accompa-
nied by the arresting vessel or not, must be brought to such harbor as is 
determined by the cause of the arrest59.
In the latter case, article 110(3) of the 1982 Convention provides 
that “[i]f the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the 
ship boarded has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be com-
pensated for any loss or damage that may have been sustained.”60
necessary to proceed to the merchantman in order to search her. In all cases, then, a 
warship exercising her droit de visite should do so aboard the suspect vessel.”
55  Openheim, id.
56  Reuland, supra note 13, at 1175, footnote 36.
57  Oppenheim, supra note 54, at para. 269, explains: “Search is effected by an of-
ficer and some of the crew of the man-of-war, the master and crew of the vessel to be 
searched not being obliged to render any assistance whatever, except to open locked 
cupboards and the like. The search must take place in an orderly way, and no damage 
must be done to the cargo. If the search proves everything to be in order, the searching 
party must carefully replace everything removed, a memorandum of the search is to 
be made in the log-book, and the searched vessel is to be allowed to proceed on her 
course”.
58  Reuland, supra note 13, at 1176.
59  Oppenheim, supra note 54, at para. 270.
60  An example of unfounded suspicion is given by the MV Nisha incident. It is worth 
166 Volume 14 Number 2 January 2017
Jurnal Hukum Internasional
B. SELF-DEFENCE TO JUSTIFY MARITIME INTERDICTION 
OPERATIONS AGAINST TERRORIST THREATS?
As noted above, the right of visit enshrined in Article 110 of the 
1982 Convention provides limited leeway to States when they want 
to interdict a ship that poses a maritime terrorist threat. Indeed, if no 
‘powers conferred by treaty’ exist, the warship’s interference must be 
contingent upon the existence of a reasonable suspicion that the foreign 
ship is engaged in one of the activities listed in the said Article, other-
wise the interdicting operation cannot be carried out. Furthermore, the 
existence of a treaty authorizing a warship to visit a vessel suspected 
of being involved in terrorist activities is not always sufficient to en-
hance maritime security. Flag State delay or denial in authorisation of 
the visit, or request for obstructive conditions in conducting a boarding, 
for instance, all could increase the risk of missing the opportunity to 
thwart a terrorist attack. A certain number of authors61, but few States 
(see infra), have therefore decided to take another path to tackle mari-
time terrorist threats. They argue that the right of self-defence is appro-
priate to justify maritime interception operations (i.e. stopping, board-
ing, searching, seizing) against vessels engaged in terrorist activities or, 
more generally, vessels viewed as posing a security threat to them (e.g. 
vessels carrying nuclear or other sensitive materials and technologies 
for illicit purposes).
The customary right of self-defence is enshrined in Article 51 of the 
mentioning however that the incident did not happen on the high sea but in the Eng-
lish Channel. That cargo ship was carrying 26,000 tonnes of raw sugar to the Tate and 
Lyle sugar refinery in Silvertown, east London, when, suspected of carrying terrorist 
material, it was interdicted by British authorities. After a five-day search, suspicion 
proved unfounded and the ship was allowed to complete its journey. See House of 
Commons Select Committee on Defence, Sixth Report (Jul. 24 2002), available ath-
ttp://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmdfence/518/51802.
htm. Following the incident, the owners of the ship stated they would consider suing 
British authorities. See D. Brown, ‘Campaign against terrorism: owners of ship seized 
in Channel consider suing police’, Independent, Dec. 28, 2001, at 5.
61 See, e.g., Barry, supra note 29, at 327; Douglas Guilfoyle, ‘The Proliferation Se-
curity Initiative: Interdicting Vessels in International Waters to Prevent the Spread of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Melbourne University Law Review, vol. 29, 2005, 
733-764; Reuland, supra note 13, at 1206-1223; Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘The 
Proliferation Security Initiative: Security vs. Freedom of Navigation?’, International 
Law Studies, vol. 81 (US Naval War college), 2006, at 65.
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UN Charter. The first sentence provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of in-
dividual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
This provision subordinates recourse to the right of self-defence “to 
certain restrictions and to specific rules”62. In the opinion of the present 
writer, an action in self-defence can only be triggered in case of armed 
attack by a State. The requirement for an armed attack to exist was con-
firmed in the Nicaragua case by the International Court of Justice [here-
inafter “the Court”] which held that such an attack is “the condition sine 
qua non required for the exercise of the right of […] self-defence”63. 
The answer to the question whether a particular form of use of force 
by a State might be qualified as an armed attack depends upon the de-
gree of gravity of the said act64. With regard to the question whether an 
armed attack must be attributed to a State or whether it may be carried 
out by non-State actorswho have no sufficient connection with a State 
for attributing their violent conduct to that State, the Court has recalled 
for almost forty years that an armed attack is and must be understood 
as being an act of State. For example, in the Wall case, when answering 
the question whether the construction of a wall between Israel and Pal-
62  Roberto Ago, ‘Addendum to the eighth report on State responsibility: The interna-
tionally wrongful act of the State, source of international responsibility’, Y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n, Vol. II, Part. One, 1980, at 63, para. 108.
63 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United 
States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, para. 237 [hereinafter “Ni-
caragua case”]. See alsoOil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of 
America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2003, para. 51 [hereinafter “Oil Platforms case”].
64  For a study on the degree of gravity of an armed attack, see Eric Corthay, La lutte 
contre le terrorisme international, De la licéité du recours à la force armée, Bâle, 
Helbing Lichtenhahn, 2012, at 104-117. In Nicaragua case, the Court held: “As re-
gards certain particular aspects of the principle [prohibiting the use of force], it will be 
necessary to distinguish the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an 
armed attack) from other less grave forms.” Nicaragua case, id., para. 191. Referring 
to the Friendly Relations Declaration, the Court stated also that “organizing, instigat-
ing, assisting or participating in […] terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in 
organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts” 
are examples of what constitute “less grave forms” of use of force and not armed at-
tacks. Id. 
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estine could be justified by the right of self-defence, the Court held that 
“Article 51 of the Charter […] recognizes the existence of an inherent 
right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against 
another State.”65 Then, as “Israel [did] not claim that the attacks against 
it are imputable to a foreign State” the Court concluded that Article 51 
of the UN Charter had no relevance in this case66.Last but not least, the 
action taken in self-defence must comply with the customary67 require-
ments of the necessity, proportionality and immediacy (see infra).
It is well known that, since the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945, 
almost every single point related to the conditions of invocation and the 
conditions of implementation of the right of self-defence are debated 
by the scholars and show divisions between States68. This paper does 
not intend to address all the issues surrounding this right but focuses on 
two reasons why it is difficult to justify interdiction operations carried 
out in order to counter terrorist threats on the high seas by the right of 
self-defence. The first reason relates to the differences in rationale and 
legal regime between the force deployed during interdiction operations 
and the one used in self-defence (a); the second reason concerns the 
existence or not of a right of anticipatory self-defence (b). 
1. Two Types of Use of Force
As reflected in the Articles on Responsibility of States for Inter-
nationally Wrongful Acts69, self-defence is a circumstance precluding 
65 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, para. 139.
66 Id. See alsoOil Platforms case, supra note 63, para. 51 and 61. In 1986, in the 
Nicaragua case, the Court linked and quasi assimilated the concept of armed attack 
mentioned under Article 51 of the UN Charter with the concept of aggression used in 
the Annex (Definition of Aggression) to the Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of the General 
Assembly. Nicaragua case, supra note 63, para. 195. Article I of the Annex defines the 
concept of aggression as “[…] the use of armed force by a State against the sover-
eignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations”.
67 Nicaragua case, id., para. 176.
68  For an analysis of the debates and State practice on the right of self-defense, see 
Corthay, supra note 64, at 77-339, Tom Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the 
UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2010.
69 See Resolution 56/83 of Dec. 12, 2001, in which the General Assembly took note 
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wrongfulness70. However, it does not exclude the wrongfulness of any 
kind of conduct, but only the wrongfulness of an act of use of force 
banned by the international law. Ago observed that “self-defence is to 
be regarded as an exceptional circumstance precluding the wrongful-
ness of conduct inconsistent with a general obligation to refrain from 
the use of force”71.
The use of force which States have the obligation to refrain from 
is the one referred to in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which codifies 
the fundamental principle prohibiting the use of force by States in their 
international relations. Article 2(4) provides:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the 
United Nations.
The term ‘force’ mentioned in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is 
limited to the notion of direct or indirect ‘armed force’72. A clear ex-
ample of armed force is the military force deployed by the different 
components of the national defence forces (army, navy, air forces), as it 
is the case during wars, aggressions, and their counterpart: self-defence 
operations.
It should be noted, here, that interdiction operations,also,might 
imply the commitment of national defence forcesand the recourse to 
armed force. With regard to the United States’ practice, Allen writes:
Vessel interceptions and boarding by naval vessels are generally carried 
of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally Wrongful Acts 
[hereinafter “Draft Articles”].
70 Art. 21 of the Draft Articles provides: “The wrongfulness of an act of a State is pre-
cluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with 
the Charter of the United Nations”.
71  Ago, supra note 62, at 52, para. 83.
72 See notably Hans Wehberg, ‘L’interdiction du recours à la force. Le principe et 
les problèmes qui se posent’, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of Interna-
tional Law, t. 78, 1951, at 69 [hereinafter “Collected Courses…”]; Dereck W. Bowett, 
Self-Defence in International Law, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1958, 
at 148; Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford, Clar-
endon Press, 1963, at 362. On the definition of the term ‘armed force’, see Corthay, 
supra note 64, at 94-104.
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out by visit, board, search and seizure (VBSS) teams drawn from the US 
Maritime Forces. Boarding teams from US navy platforms may include 
Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard personnel73.
Allen also observes that interdiction (interception) operations might 
occasionally require the use of force:
If the MIO [maritime interception operations] on scene commander con-
cludes the boarding will be opposed or non-compliant, the VBSS team 
may be augmented by special operations forces. SEAL and Marine Corps 
Maritime Special Purpose Force (MSPF) members assigned to helicopter 
assault force teams are trained to fast-rope from helicopters to the deck 
of the ship (vertical take-downs), engage and neutralize any hostile forces 
aboard, and gain control of the vessel74.
Even though the use of force that might be carried out during inter-
diction operations at sea is not generally prohibited75,it is not left at the 
sole discretion of the intercepting State but must rather respect specific 
requisites: the use of force must be avoided as far as possible, and, if 
unavoidable, it must respect the standards of reasonableness and ne-
cessity. In the M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2) case, for example, the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea stated: 
Although the Convention does not contain express provisions on the use of 
force in the arrest of ships, international law, which is applicable by vir-
tue of article 293 of the Convention, requires that the use of force must be 
avoided as far as possible and, where force is unavoidable, it must not go 
beyond what is reasonable and necessary in the circumstances. Consid-
erations of humanity must apply in the law of the sea, as they do in other 
areas of international law76.
73  Craig H. Allen, ‘Limits on the Use of Force in Maritime Operations in Support of 
WMD Counter-Proliferation Initiatives’, International Law Studies, vol. 81 (US Na-
val War College), 2006, at 79 (footnotes omitted).
74 Id., at 81 (footnotes omitted).
75 See M/V ‘Virginia G’ (Panama v. Guinea-Bissau), Judgment, ITLOS Case No 19 
(2014), para 360, available athttps://www.itlos.org/cases/list-of-cases/case-no-19/ 
[hereinafter “M/V ‘Virginia G’ case”]
76 M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2) case, supra note 52, para. 155. The Tribunal relied in part on the 
I’m Alone and Red Crusader cases. SeeS.S. I’m Alone case (Canada/United States), 
RIAA, vol. 3, 1949, at 1615 and 1617; Investigation of certain incidents affecting 
the British trawler Red Crusader,Report of Mar. 23, 1962, of the Commission of En-
quiry established by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Terrorist threat on the high seas : Analysis of some aspects ...
171Volume 14 Number 2 January 2017
In the same judgment, the Tribunal concluded that these three prin-
ciples – unavoidability, reasonableness and necessity77 – “have been 
followed over the years in law enforcement operations at sea” and rep-
resent “[t]he basic principle[s] concerning the use of force in the arrest 
of a ship at sea”78.
Similarly, military operations conducted in self-defence must also 
comply with specific requirements. These “essential conditions for the 
admissibility of the plea of self-defence in a given case”79 are the three 
requirements of necessity, proportionality, and immediacy (see infra). 
The requirement of necessity was described by Ago as follows: “[t]he 
reason for stressing that action taken in self-defense must be necessary 
is that the State attacked […] must not, in the particular circumstances, 
have had any means of halting the attack other than recourse to armed 
force”80.With regard to the condition of proportionality, Ago contended 
that “[t]he requirement of the proportionality of the action taken in 
self-defense […] concerns the relationship between that action and its 
purpose, namely – and this can never be repeated too often – that of 
halting and repelling the attack”81.
Notwithstanding the fact that both interdiction operations and ac-
tions in self-defence can be conducted by military personnel and must 
respect specific requisites, it is important to emphasise that the use of 
force authorized during interdiction operations, when boarding and 
searching a private vessel on the high seas in time of peace, is intrinsi-
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark on Nov. 15, 1961, 
RIAA,vol. XXIX, 1962, at 538. The standards referred to by the Tribunal in the M/V 
Saiga (No. 2) case are also reiterated by the Tribunal in the more recent M/V ‘Virginia 
G’ case, supra note 75, para. 359.
77 Enriko Milano, Irini Papanicolopulu, ‘State Responsibility in Disputed Areas on 
Land and at Sea’, Zeitschrift für Ausländishes öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 
vol. 71, 2011, at 623-624, wrote : “International judges have identified in the unavoid-
ability, reasonableness and necessity the conditions for the exercise of enforcement 
action. It therefore appears that law enforcement activities are permitted, in so far as 
force is used only as the last resort and is proportionate to the circumstances and the 
aim pursued.”
78 M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2) case, supra note 52, para. 156.
79 Ago, supra note 62, at 69, para. 119.
80 Id., para. 120.
81 Id., para. 121.
172 Volume 14 Number 2 January 2017
Jurnal Hukum Internasional
cally distinct from the use of force referred to in Article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter82 and carried out during a self-defence operation in reaction to 
an armed attack. Indeed, the two notions of use of force are concep-
tually different83 and governed by two different bodies of rules84.The 
use of force mentioned in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter refers to the 
conduct of a State directed against another State, and is covered by the 
relevant provisions of the UN Charter. In contrast, the limited use of 
force authorized in the course of interdiction operations in time of peace 
“refer[s] to the means used by authorized government vessels and their 
agents to compel individuals to comply with enforcement actions”85. 
The force used during interdiction operations relates, therefore, to mari-
time law enforcement activities (i.e. police measures) against private 
vessels.This form of use of force is governed by the law of the sea 
and does not violate Article 301 of the1982 Convention which requires 
States to refrain from any threat or use of force inconsistent with the 
UN Charter.Furthermore, these two common usages of the term force 
have different rationales: while the purpose ofthe interdiction of the 
use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter – and its exception: 
the right of self-defence – is the protection of “sovereign rights” (e.g. 
territorial integrity, political independence), the aim of the police force 
deployed during interdiction operations is “the advancement of the in-
terests of international community”86.
82  Cristian DeFrancia, ‘Enforcing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: the Legal-
ity of Preventive Measures’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 45, 2012, 
at 769. Patricia Jimenez Kwast, ‘Maritime Law Enforcement and the Use of Force: 
Reflections on the Categorisation of Forcible Action at Sea in the Light of the Guyana/
Suriname Award’, Journal of Conflict & Security Law, vol. 13, 2008, at 58. Contra 
Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea, Cambridge, Cam-
bridge University Press, 2009, at 275-276.
83  Milano & Papanicolopulu, supra note 77, at 623.
84  Olivier Corten, The Law Against War, The Prohibition on the Use of Force in Con-
temporary International Law, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2012, 
at 59.
85  Allen, supra note 73, at 89 (footnote omitted).
86  Efthymios D. Papastavridis, ‘The Use of Force at Sea in the 21st Century: Some 
Reflections on the Proper Legal Framework(s)’, The Journal of Territorial and Mari-
time Studies, vol. 2, 2015, at 132.
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2. The alleged right of anticipatory self-defence
In a world where oceans can be used by terrorists – or other actors 
who intend to support terrorists– who threaten members of the inter-
national community and have decided, in the not too distant future, to 
attack them, the question is raised of the legality of an action in self-
defence in anticipation of their attacks.
a. The doctrine of anticipatory self-defence
The doctrine of anticipatory self-defence, according to which an ac-
tion in self-defence could be triggered before an armed attack occurs,has 
beensupported by some scholars for a long time87. Even more support is 
given since the upsurge of counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation 
efforts88.The concept of anticipatory self-defence has also been referred 
to in the maritime security context89. For example, Bowett states:
It can scarcely be contemplated that a state must remain passive whilst a 
serious menace to its security mounts on the high seas beyond its territo-
rial sea. It is accordingly maintained that it is still permissible for a state 
to assume a protective jurisdiction, within the limits circumscribing every 
exercise of the right of self-defence, upon the high seas in order to protect 
its ships, its aircraft, and its rights of territorial integrity and political 
independence from an imminent danger or actual attack90.
87 See, e.g., Humphrey Waldock, ‘The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual 
States in International Law’, Collected Courses…,t. 81, 1952-II, at 498; Derek W. 
Bowett, supra note 72, at 187; Oscar Schachter, ‘In Defense of International Rules on 
the Use of Force’, University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 53, 1986, at 136; Thomas 
M. Franck, ‘What Happens Now? The United Nations after Iraq’, American Journal 
of International Law, vol. 97(3), 2003, at 619; Natalino Ronzitti, ‘The Expanding Law 
of Self-Defence’, Journal of Conflict & Security Law, vol. 11, 2006, at 347.
88  Klein, supra note 32, at 271.
89 See, e.g., Dominic Raab, ‘’Armed Attack’ after the Oil Platforms Case’, Leiden 
Journal of International Law, vol. 17, 2004, at 728; Michael Byers, ‘Policing the High 
Seas: The Proliferation Security Initiative’, American Journal of International Law, 
vol. 98, 2004, at 532; Barry, supra note 29, at 324; Vaughan Lowe, ‘Clear and Present 
Danger: Responses to Terrorism’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 
54, 2005, at 191; Patricia Jimenez Kwast, ‘Maritime Interdiction of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction in an International Legal Perspective’, Netherlands Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law, vol. 38, 2007, at 202. 
90  Bowett, supra note 72, at 71. His view is also supported by previous authors like 
William E. Hall, A Treatise on International law, Oxford, Clarendon Press (ed. by J. B. 
Atlay), 1909, at 328; John Westlake, International Law, vol. 1, Cambridge, Cambridge 
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More specifically, anticipatory self-defence has been invoked as a 
legal justification for the interdiction of vessels engaged in unlawful 
activities. For example, Colombos contends:
The right of self-defence, as recognized by the law of nations, will confer 
on a State, in a case where its safety is threatened, a self-protective juris-
diction which will entitle it to visit and arrest a vessel on the high seas and 
to send her in for adjudication91.
From a semantic viewpoint and before analysing the validity in 
law of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence, it must be stressed that 
the terms ‘anticipatory self-defence’, ‘preventive self-defence’, ‘pre-
emptive self-defence’ have no recognized definitions in international 
law. Sometimes, authors and governments use the same term to express 
different ideas92. For the sake of clarification, in the present paper the 
term anticipatory self-defence embraces the two concepts of preventive 
self-defence and pre-emptive self-defence.
Preventive self-defence is invoked when the launch of an attack is 
imminent. Understanding the meaning of that term is helped by refer-
ring to the US doctrine. In the 2007 Operational Law Handbook, the 
US Government – who called it anticipatory self-defence – defines pre-
ventive self-defence as follows: 
Anticipatory self-defense justifies using force in anticipation of an ‘immi-
nent’ armed attack. Under this concept, a State is not required to absorb 
the ‘first hit’ before it can resort to the use of force in self-defense to repel 
an imminent attack.93
University Press, 1910, at 171; Philip C. Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and 
Maritime jurisdiction, New York, G. A. Jennings, 1927, at 97-98; Charles C. Hyde, 
International Law: chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, Boston, 
Little, Brown, 1947, at 245; Herbert A. Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea, Lon-
don, Steven and Sons, 1959, at 70-71.
91  Constantine J. Colombos, The International Law of the Sea, London, Longman, 
1967, at 315. See also Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 61, at 66; Jimenez Kwast, 
supra note 89, at 202; Matthew A. Fitzgerald, ‘Seizing Weapons of Mass Destruction 
from Foreign-Flagged Ships on the High Seas Under Article 51 of the UN Charter’, 
Virginia Journal of International law, vol. 49, 2008-2009, at 481. 
92 See examples given in Corthay, supra note 64, at 291, footnote 862.
93 International and Operational Law Department, Operational Law Handbook, The 
Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center & School, US Army, Charlottesville, Virgin-
ia, 2007, at 6, available athttp://www.jagcnet.army.mil [hereinafter “2007 Operational 
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The 2007 Operational Law Handbook also contends that the right 
of preventive self-defence is a customary right “which was not ‘negoti-
ated’ away under the Charter”94.According to the US Government, the 
roots of preventive self-defence were found in the now famous state-
ment made by Secretary Webster during the1837 Caroline case. Indeed, 
the 2009 Operational Law Handbook states:
Secretary Webster posited that a State need not suffer an actual armed 
attack before taking defensive action, but may engage in anticipatory 
self-defense if the circumstances leading to the use of force are ‘instanta-
neous, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means and no moment for 
deliberation.’95
For the US Government, the implementation of the right of preven-
tive self-defence requests the fulfilment of certain conditions: “the right 
of anticipatory self-defense has been predicated upon knowing, with a 
reasonable level of certainty, the time and place of an enemy’s forth-
coming attack”96.
Later on, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Bush 
Administration explained that the United States “must adapt the con-
cept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s 
adversaries”97. Two factors led to the adaptation of the concept of im-
minence: the devastating destructive nature of weapons of mass de-
struction that could fall from rogue States into the hands of terrorists 
(capabilities)98, and the very intention of terrorists and rogue States to 
Law Handbook”].
94 Id.
95 International and Operational Law Department, Operational Law Handbook, The 
Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center & School, US Army, Charlottesville, Virgin-
ia, 2009, at 6, available athttp://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/operational-law-
handbooks.html.
96  2007 Operational Law Handbook, supra note 93, at 7.
97 National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America, Sept. 2002, at 15, available athttp://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
nsc/nss/2002/ [hereinafter “2002 National Security Strategy”].
98  In 2003, the Undersecretary of State, John Bolton, also known as the architect of 
the Proliferation Security Initiative, stated that his country had “a general right of 
self-defence” if there was a serious belief that the North Korean vessels were carrying 
material for use in WMDs. Greg Sheridan, ‘US “Free” to Board N Korea Shipping’, 
The Australian, Jul. 9, 2003, at 1.
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use these weapons against the United States (objectives)99. Therefore, 
the Bush Administration expanded the use of force doctrine from pre-
ventive to pre-emptive self-defence. The new doctrine of pre-emptive 
self-defence is explained in the 2002 and 2006 US National Security 
Strategy as follows:
If necessary, however, under long-standing principles of self-defense, we 
do not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty 
remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. When the conse-
quences of an attack with WMD are potentially so devastating, we cannot 
afford to stand idly by as grave dangers materialize. This is the principle 
and logic of preemption.100
The important point is that the similarity between both doctrines 
(preventive and pre-emptive self-defence) lies in the fact that there is, in 
both cases, a high level of certainty that an attack will occur. The differ-
ence, however, concerns the level of certainty as to the time and place 
of the forthcoming attack101.
3. Rejection of a Right of Anticipatory Self-Defence 
Even though the existence of a customary right of anticipatory 
self-defence is supported by some scholars and States, the analysis of 
the purpose of the customary law of self-defence as understood at the 
dawning of the adoption of the UN Charter, the interpretation of the let-
ter and spirit of Article 51 of the said Charter, the actual State practice 
99 President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point, Jun. 1, 2002, available at 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/15425.htm : “When the spread of chemical and 
biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology - when that 
occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike 
great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught 
seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm 
us, or to harm our friends […].”
100 National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America, Mar. 2006, at 23, available athttp://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
nsc/nss/2006/. See also2002 National Security Strategy, supra note 97, at 15: “The 
greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case 
for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the 
time and place of the enemy’s attack.”
101  On the concept of imminence in relation with both doctrines, see Corthay, supra 
note 64, at 291-295, 317-318.
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subsequent to the adoption of it, as well as the view of the International 
Court of Justice, all lead to the conclusion that to date the alleged right 
of anticipatory self-defence has no place in international law. 
Acting in self-defence to prevent or deter a future attack is nothing 
more than implementing the nineteenth century concept of self-help 
(or self-preservation, self-protection). At that time, the two concepts 
– self-defence, self-help – were very similar; both expressed the right 
for the State to ensure its own security102.In the 1837Caroline case, for 
instance, the two notions were indistinctly associated103. During the 
nineteenth century, self-defence (or self-help) was invoked in many dif-
fering situations. Humphrey Waldock observed that
legitimate self-defense has three main requirements: (1) An actual in-
fringement or threat of infringement of the rights of the defending State; 
(2) A failure or inability on the part of the other State to use its own legal 
powers to stop or prevent the infringement; and (3) Acts of self-defense 
strictly confined to the object of stopping or preventing the infringement 
and reasonably proportionate to what is required for achieving this ob-
ject104.
However, during the 1920s’ and 1930s’ the concept of self-defence 
has progressively emerged as an exception to the prohibition of the use 
of force. Simultaneously, the purpose of an action in self-defense has 
been significantly narrowed. Indeed, Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, who 
analysed State practice during the inter-war period, came to the conclu-
sion that self-defence was perceived at that time as only a reaction, a 
reaction against an attack, an armed attack or an invasion105. Therefore, 
during the 1930s and especially at the time of the adoption of the UN 
Charter in 1945, the purpose of the right of self-defence had been lim-
ited to the one of halting and repelling an actual armed attack. 
With regards to the UN Charter, its Article 51 provides that “[n]oth-
ing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual 
102 See Brownlie, supra note 72,at 43.
103 See Robert Y. Jennings, ‘The Caroline and McLeod Cases, American Journal of 
International Law, vol. 32(1), 1938, at 82 ff.
104  Waldock, supra note 87, at 463-464.
105  Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, Les réactions décentralisées à l’illicite:des contre-
mesures à la légitime défense, Paris, LGDJ, 1990, at 297.
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or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs”106. The wording 
“if an armed attack occurs” is very restrictive; it does not mean “if the 
threat of an armed attack occurs”. In other words, a textual interpreta-
tion of Article 51 leads to the conclusion that the existence of an actual 
armed attack is an imperative condition for the exercise of the right 
of self-defence107. Kunz,who contended that the right of self-defence 
“does not exist against any form of aggression which does not consti-
tute ‘armed attack’, wrote:
this term [armed attack] means something that has taken place. Art. 51 
prohibits ‘preventive war’. The ‘threat of aggression’ does not justify self-
defense under Art. 51. […] The ‘imminent’ armed attack does not suffice 
under Art. 51.108
In addition, purposive interpretation of the UN Charter also sup-
ports the argument of a rejection of a right of anticipatory self-defence. 
Indeed, the will of those who drafted the UN Charter was to limit as 
much as possible the right for States to use force in their international 
relations. Their aims were not to recognize a right of self-protection 
that could be invoked every time a State is threatened109. Use of force in 
case of threat to international peace and security can only be envisaged 
through the system of collective security. This system is, primarily110, 
in the hands of the Security Councilwhich has the monopoly of the use 
of force in prevention of acts injurious to international peace and secu-
rity111.
106  Emphasis added.
107 SeeHans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations. A Critical Analysis of its Funda-
mental Problems,London, Stevens, 1950, at 797. Contra Myres S. McDougal, ‘The 
Soviet-Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense’, American Journal of International Law, 
vol. 57(3), 1963, at 600.
108  Josef L. Kunz, ‘Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter 
of the United Nations’, American Journal of International Law, vol. 41(4), 1947, at 
878.
109 See Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 2nd ed., 1979, at 142; Albrecht Randelzhofer, ‘Article 
51’, in: Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations, A Commentary, vol. I, 
Munich, C. H. Beck, 2002, at 803.
110 See art. 24 of the UN Charter.
111 See Théodore Christakis, ‘Existe-t-il un droit de légitime défense en cas de simple 
‘menace’? Une réponse au ‘groupe de personnalités de haut niveau’ de l’ONU’, in: 
Société française pour le droit international, Les métamorphoses de la sécurité collec-
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It is therefore apparent that in 1945 the ratione temporisscope of the 
right of self-defence has received a very restrictive interpretation. The 
analysis of actual State practice subsequent to the adoption of the UN 
Charter confirms such a strict interpretation and the lack of evolution of 
a customary right that would authorize military operations in anticipa-
tion of an armed attack.
State’s practice related to the invocation of anticipatory self-defence 
as a ground for the interdiction of vessels is limited to few cases112.In 
January 2002, Israel Defence Forces intercepted the Karin A, an Iraqi-
flagged ship carrying, according to Israel, weapons for the Palestinian 
Authority. The Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Na-
tions stated that “their seizure constitutes a vital act of self-defence and 
an important counter-terrorist measure”113. While most of the interna-
tional community did not comment on the legality of the Israeli opera-
tion114, the then-US Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, qualified the 
Israeli operation as “a legitimate act of self-defense, noting that the US 
had conducted similar maritime operations”115. Indeed, after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, the United States boarded vessels in the Indian Ocean, 
the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz in search of Osama bin Laden and 
his henchmen116. Dyke notes that “[a]lthough the specific legal basis 
tive. Droit, pratique et enjeux stratégiques, Paris, Pedone, 2005, at 210, footnote 42. 
See also Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, ICJ Reports2005, para. 148.
112  In 1986, with regard to the Tanker War, the UK Foreign Secretary stated: “under 
article 51 of the United Nations charter [sic] a state such as Iran, actively engaged in 
an armed conflict, is entitled in exercise of its inherent right of self-defence, to stop 
and search a foreign merchant ship on the high seas if there is reasonable ground for 
suspecting that the ship is taking arms to the other side for use in the conflict”. UK, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, Jan. 28, 1986, at 426, quoted in Douglas 
Guilfoyle, supra note 61, at 743. In the opinion of the present writer the interdiction 
operation conducted by Iran is governed by – and should be analyzed under – the bel-
ligerent right of visit applied in time of conflict, but not by the right of self-defense 
applied in time of peace.
113  Letter dated Jan. 4, 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2002/25.
114  Michael Byers, supra note 89, at 534.
115 Cited in Jon M. Van Dyke, ‘The Disappearing Right to Navigational Freedom in 
the Exclusive Economic Zone’, Marine Policy, vol. 29(2), 2005, at 118.
116  Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS), Conference on Maritime 
Operations Organized by the Russian Academy of Liberal Arts and Information Tech-
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for these searches has never been articulated, U.S. President George W. 
Bush has said generally that U.S. actions to respond to the attacks by 
al Qaeda are “acts of self-defense””117.Dyke’s observations are some-
how confirmed by the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security.
Preventing terrorist attacks is one of the strategic objectives listed and 
explained in the 2005 official document which states:
The United States will prevent potential adversaries from attacking the 
maritime domain or committing unlawful acts there by monitoring and 
patrolling […] high seas areas of national interests, and by stopping such 
activities at any stage of development or deployment118.
The document also clearly stresses that “[t]his approach does not 
negate the United States’ inherent right to self-defence or its right to act 
to protect its essential national security interests.”119It seems, therefore, 
that the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security envisages self-
defence as lawful when carried out in order to prevent terrorist attacks.
In a context other than maritime, some States – notably the United 
States and Israel – have also resorted to the use of force in anticipa-
tion of terrorist attacks. All have invoked self-defence as a justification 
for their action. It was, inter alia, the case during the Israeli airstrikes 
against Palestinian camps in the North of Lebanon (1975), Israeli Op-
eration Litani (1978), US Operation Eldorado Canyon (1986), and 
Operation Enduring Freedom (2001)120. These operations show a radi-
cal division between other members of the international community. 
Few of them accepted a legal right of anticipatory self-defence. Many 
condemned the resort to force in concreto, and qualified the military 
nologies Education and DIILS 11-8 (St. Petersburg, Russia, June 2003), cited inJon 
M. Van Dyke, ‘Balancing Navigational Freedom with Environmental and Security 
Concerns’, Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, vol. 15, 
2004, at 25.
117 See id. 
118 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security, supra note 6, at 8.
119 Id., at 7.
120 See Corthay, supra note 64, at 241-250.
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operations notably as aggressions121 or acts of aggression122. Thus, it ap-
pearsthat States are divided on the question whether the right of antici-
patory self-defence has a place in international law. The actual practice 
of the international community of States as a whole being not uniform, 
as well as not constant, a customary right of anticipatory self-defence 
has not (yet) been able to emerge123.
Same conclusions can be drawn from an analysis of the judgment of 
the International Court of Justice. Even though, in the Nicaragua case 
of 1986, the Court did not discuss “the lawfulness of a response to the 
imminent threat of armed attack” because of the circumstance in which 
the dispute had arisen between the Parties124, the wording used by the 
Court implicitly indicates a rejection of the right of anticipatory self-de-
fence. Thus, in paragraph 176 of the judgment, the Court notes that the 
Charter “does not contain any specific rule whereby self-defence would 
warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and 
necessary to respond to it, a rule well established in customary inter-
national law”125. In paragraph 195, she declares that “[i]n the case of 
121  The following States have qualified Operation Litani as an aggression: Lebanon, 
UN Doc. S/PV.2071, Mar. 17, 1978, para. 12; Jordan, UN Doc. S/PV.2071, Mar. 17, 
1978, para. 77; Syria, UN Doc. S/PV.2071, Mar. 17, 1978, para. 88; Egypt, UN Doc. 
S/PV.2072, Mar. 18, 1978, para. 7; Kuwait, UN Doc. S/PV.2072, Mar. 18, 1978, para. 
34; Viet Nam, UN Doc. S/PV.2072, Mar. 18, 1978, para. 65; URSS, UN Doc. S/
PV.2073, Mar. 18, 1978, para. 36.
122  It was notably the case during the 1975 Israeli raid against Palestinian camps 
in Lebanon. See Egypt, UN Doc. S/PV.1859, Dec. 4, 1975, para. 113; URSS, UN 
Doc. S/PV.1860, Dec. 5, 1975, para. 6; Cameroun, UN Doc. S/PV.1861, Dec. 8, 1975, 
para. 13; China, UN Doc. S/PV.1861, Dec. 8, 1975, para. 37; Mauritania, UN Doc. 
S/PV.1861, Dec. 8, 1975, para. 44; Belarus, UN Doc. S/PV.1862, Dec. 8, 1975, para. 
3; Iraq, UN Doc. S/PV.1862, Dec. 8, 1975, para. 16; Tanzania, UN Doc. S/PV.1862, 
Dec. 8, 1975, para. 38. 
123  In line with custom-formation requirements, actual practice of the international 
community of States as a whole, – a practice that reflects their opinio juris – must 
have been constant and uniform for a new customary law of anticipatory self-defense 
to emerge. SeeContinental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 1985, para. 27; Colombian-Peruvian asylum case (Colombia v. Peru), Judg-
ment, ICJ Reports 1950, at 276.
124 Nicaragua case, supra note 63, para. 194.
125 Id., para. 176 (emphasis added). In French, the text is more explicit: “elle ne com-
porte pas la règle spécifique – pourtant bien établie en droit international coutumier 
– selon laquelle la légitime défense ne justifierait que des mesures proportionnées à 
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individual self-defence, the exercise of this right is subject to the State 
concerned having been the victim of an armed attack.”126 And finally, in 
paragraph 232, the Court held that “[t]he exercise of the right of col-
lective self-defence presupposes that an armed attack has occurred.”127
III.CONCLUSION
The discrete circumstances under which the right of visit enshrined 
in Article 110 of the 1982 Convention can be invoked do not explic-
itly include maritime terrorism. However, terrorism is one of the major 
threats to maritime security. Members of the international community 
have therefore devised multilateral, regional and bilateral treaties to 
permit interdictions against ships suspected of being involved with ter-
rorist acts on the high seas. These legal instruments are a significant 
addition to counter-terrorism efforts. Nevertheless, given the still pri-
mordial importance accorded by States to freedom of navigation and 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State, ship boarding treaties have 
been drafted with many constraints that hinder their effectiveness (e.g. 
conditions for a valid request, emphasis on express consent of a flag 
State for boarding, possibility of obstructive conditions in conducting 
a boarding).
Given the limited room offered by Article 110 of the 1982 Conven-
tion and the weaknesses of the ship boarding treaties, it is understand-
able that States and authors are suggesting and following other paths to 
respond to maritime terrorist threats. Not all of them are however legal. 
The right of anticipatory self-defence, for example, still does not exist 
under international law, and therefore any maritime interdiction opera-
tions carried out to prevent or deter a maritime terrorist attack from oc-
curring cannot be justified by that alleged right. That is not to say that 
the right of self-defence cannot be invoked by those fighting against 
terrorism on the high seas, but for that right to be properly invoked the 
conditions of its invocation and implementation must be fulfilled. In 
other word, to be lawful under the right of self-defence, the maritime 
l’agression armée subie, et nécessaires pour y riposter” (emphasis added).
126 Id., para. 195 (emphasis added).
127 Id., para. 232 (emphasis added).
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operation must respect the requirements of necessity, proportionality 
and immediacy, and its aim must be limited to stopping or repelling an 
actual terrorist attack which is attributed to a State and has a sufficient 
level of gravity. But given that terrorist attacks are most of the time very 
swift, opportunities to invoke a right of self-defence are rare.
Successfully preventing and deterring maritime terrorist attacks def-
initely serve all States. The international community must therefore put 
all necessary efforts in that regard. One solution would be to give prece-
dence to common interests (i.e. maritime security) over exclusive juris-
diction rules, by for example adopting new ship boarding treaties with 
fewer constraints. Other avenues to explore further could be to adopt 
efficient mechanisms to ensure full respect for UN Security Council 
decisions (e.g. Resolution 1373 (2001) and Resolution 1540 (2004)),to 
emphasize international cooperation and collaboration in the maritime 
domain (e.g. efficient intelligence gathering and sharing), and of course 
to address the root causes of terrorism.
